Since Bennett and Brassard [1] suggested their quantum key distribution protocol(BB84 protocol) in 1984, the subject has been extensively studied both theoretically and experimentally. The protocol allows two remote parties Alice and Bob to create and share a secret key using a quantum channel and public authenticated communications. The quantum key created in this way is in principle secure because eavesdroppers have no way to tap the quantum channel without disturb it. In the protocol, two level quantum bits are measured in two basis, X and Z randomly by Bob. So at least half of the measurement results will be discarded because Bob has a half probability taking the measurement in a wrong basis. On the other hand, the security is not the maximum in BB84 protocol. To increase the security, one may straightforwardly increase the number of basis used in the protocol. For example, six state protocol was proposed recently [2] for two level system. However, in this way, it seems to be the case that the higher the security is, the more measurement results will be finally discarded. So it should be interesting to find a protocol by which both the economy and security are maximized. It looks impossible at a first sight to the strategy. Here we give a new protocol to maximize both economy and security simultaneously. In the new protocol Bob can always measures the qubits in correct basis so that no measurement results will be discarded( except the ones used to check eavesdropping) in principle. Besides this, we give the condition to maximize the security of the protocol under the symmetric channel.
In the BB84 protocol and all other QKD protocols raised previously, Bob takes measurement to each individual qubit in a basis randomly chosen from certain set before Alice announces the correct bases. So it is impossible for Bob to always takes the correct basis. In our new protocol, after Bob receives the qubits from Alice, he informs Alice so through public channel and stores the qubits at the moment. Informed by Bob that he has received the qubits, Alice announces the correct bases for all qubits. Bob then measures each qubits in the bases announced by Alice. Our protocol works in the following way:(The Rome words are remarks to the protocol) Protocol 1: General Efficient Protocol 1. Alice prepares n independent qubits by the state |Q A = |Ψ 1 ⊗ |Ψ 2 · · · |Ψ n . Here |Ψ k is the state of kth qubit, k from 1 to n. The state of each individual qubits is randomly chosen from the set of 2m states V = {|ψ 1 , |ψ 2 · · · |ψ m , |ψ
) is the basis of Z and i from 1 to m. R 0 is a rotating operator, θ i , φ i are two independent rotating angles in x − z plane and x − y plane, respectively . So, each state |Ψ k here is determined by two criterions, one is the subset it is chosen from, i.e. {|ψ i } or {|ψ ′ i }, the other is R 0 operator. For simplicity, we denote the rotating operator corresponding to the kth qubit as R 0 (k). For example, if |Ψ k = R 0 (θ x , φ x ), then we say R 0 (k) = R 0 (θ x , φ x ). She records each individual state |Ψ k by the classical bit 0 if it is from the subset {|ψ i }, or classical bit 1 if it is from subset {|ψ ′ i }, so that she has a string of classical bits, S c . 2. Alices sends the qubits to Bob. She sends them in a way that, to each qubit, Bob knows its subscript k(but not its state vector |Ψ k ). For example, she can send them one by one. 3. Bob stores the qubits, and informs Alice through classical public channel that he has received them. This step is the heart of our work. 4. Alice announces the information of {R 0 (k)}, k from 1 to n. This can also be regarded the announcement of the correct measurement bases for each individual qubits. 5. Bob measures each qubit in the basis announced by Alice accordingly. He records the measurement results of each qubits in order. Whenever a bit is from subset {|ψ ′ i } (or {|ψ i }), he records it as 0( or 1). 6. Bob randomly chooses a subset(G) of the measurement results and compare them with the corresponding records in S A kept by Alice. The comparison is done through public channel. 7. If all the results are the same, they believe there is no eavesdropping. Or for the known noisy channel, if the correlation is higher than certain threshold, they accept it. 8. With the subset G discarded, the original record S c of Alice is now the shared key. 9. For the noisy channel, error correction can be done [3] for the privacy amplification. Since BB84 protocol and the 6 state protocol have been proven secure already [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , to demonstrate the security of our efficient protocol, we first choose two specific cases of our protocol and compare them with the BB84 and 6 states protocol, respectively. We have Efficient BB84 protocol(EBB84 protocol): If we fix the value of all φ i = 0 and restrict the values of θ i being randomly chosen from the set {0, π/2}, we get our efficient BB84 protocol. Efficient 6 state protocol: Similarly, If we restrict the values of θ i and {φ i } being randomly chosen from the sets {0, π/2} and {0, π/2}, we get our efficient 6 state protocol.
Proposition 1: The efficient BB84 protocol and the efficient 6 state protocol are secure. In the following security proof, we just take the efficient BB84 protocol as an example. The proof for the efficient 6 state protocol can be done in a similar way. Consider both BB84 and EBB84 protocols. Most generally, there are two criterions to measure the security of a protocol. One is the information(I AE ) about S A eavesdropper can obtain after an attack, the other is the disturbance(D) caused by the attack to each qubits. Suppose one uses certain function F (I AE , D) to quantify the security under certain attack. F should be a decreasing function of I AE and increasing function of D.( We need not give any specific formula for the F function here.) In general, the eavesdropper may intercept the qubits from Alice, take certain operation O to ρ A = |Q A Q A | and her ancilla ρ E . After the operationÔ, ρ A is changed into ρ ′ s measurement basis in BB84 protocol is useless to eavesdropper. The eavesdropper may latter, take optimized measurement M at time t M to maximally obtain the information of S A . Note since no operation of eavesdropper can change the value D, to minimize F value, eavesdropper just chooses certain measurement M which maximizes her information on S A . In general, M is dependent on bases announced by Alice. The specific time at which M is carried out does not matter. We assume M is taken immediately after Alice announces the bases information. So far we we have shown that both the disturbance D and the information I AE are irrelevant to anything done by Bob. They are also irrelevant to operations done by Alice after t A . So, we can disregard everything done by Bob in the whole protocol and disregard everything done by Alice after time t A in calculating the F value for both BB84 and EBB84 protocols. After disregarding all these irrelevant issues, the BB84 protocol and our EBB84 protocol are identical. Therefore, given the same attack, the value of security function F (I AE , D) must be the same for BB84 protocol and EBB84 protocol. Suppose we have a standard that a protocol is secure if F value larger than certain threshold F 0 . Assume there is an attack under which F > F 0 for BB84 protocol. Then we can use the same attack to EBB84 and we must also have F > F 0 . This is to say, if BB84 protocol is secure, then EBB84 protocol is also secure. It has been shown already that BB84 protocol is secure [5] [6] [7] [8] . So we get proposition 1 above. In the BB84 protocol, half of the measurement results are discarded because of the wrong measurement taken by Bob. In our modified protocol, we have doubled the efficiency. Obviously, our revised 6 state protocol have tripled the efficiency while maintaining the same security compared with original one.
More generally, we can consider a protocol P and an efficient protocol EP. In protocol P Bob takes the individual measurement to each qubit in bases randomly chosen from certain set before Alice announces the correct bases used to each individual qubits. All other steps are just same with BB84. In protocol EP, informed by Bob that he has received and stored the qubits transmitted by Alice, Alice announces the correct bases for each individual qubits first. Bob then measures each individual qubits in the bases announced by Alice accordingly. All other steps are just same with EBB84. We have the following proposition: Proposition 2. If protocol P is secure then protocol EP is secure. The proof can be done analogously to that of proposition 1.
In the Protocol 1, whatever set of bases V is chosen, Bob will always be able to measure the qubits in correct bases. Because he does so af ter Alice announces the correct bases for each individual qubits. Now we show how to find the optimized set V in protocol 1 for the symmetric channel. Here the symmetric channel is defined as the following: Suppose there are protocol EP 1 and protocol EP 2 . In protocol EP 1 , Alice chooses the states from a set V 1 , V 1 has 2m elements. In protocol EP 2 Alice chooses each states from the set V 2 , V 2 has also 2m elements. Everything else in protocol EP 1 and EP 2 is identical. We say that the channel is symmetric if under such channel, protocol EP 1 is always equivalent to EP 2 , provided that we can find a unitary transformation U satisfying UV 2 = V 1 .
Suppose in protocol 1, the security is maximized when V = V 0 . Here V 0 consists of 2m elements(states). We denote this protocol as EP 0 . Suppose in protocol EP 0 , the F value is F (EP 0 ) under eavesdropper ′ s optimal attackÔ = O(V 0 ). Now we consider protocol W, which is a special case of protocol 1 in that V consists of all states in Bloch sphere. For any single qubit |Ψ k prepared by Alice in the beginning of the protocol, we can always find m unitary operators {R ki }, i from 1 to m, so that to each i, R ki |Ψ k is the ith element or the i + mth in V 0 . In protocol W, to any transmitted qubit, if eavesdropper knows the information R ki , and to eavesdropper, i here has a uniform probability 1/m to be any number from 1 to m, she must be able to optimally attack the qubit with the F value equal to that in protocol EP 0 .
To show the maximum security of protocol W , we only need to show that the security of W is better than that of EP 0 . For this purpose, we first consider a type of partially disabled W protocol. Suppose in sending a state randomly chosen from the whole Bloch sphere, Alice always tells eavesdropper the unitary operator R ki , i is randomly chosen from 1 to m. Note that Alice tells R ki to eavesdropper, but does not tell i to her. So eavesdropper only knows how to change the state |Ψ k to one element in V 0 , but she does not know which element in V 0 that the state |Ψ k can be changed into, by operator R ki . Since to any |Ψ k , Alice choose i randomly from 1 to m to construct the R ki , R ki |Ψ k > has the same probability to be any element in V 0 . To eavesdropper, this partially disabled W protocol is a mixture of many equivalent EP 0 protocols. And to each of the protocols, the F value under optimal attack is equal to that in EP 0 .
With the information R ki from Alice eavesdropper can optimally attack all qubits used in this partially disabled W protocol. In this way, average F value here should be equal to that in pure EP 0 protocol. This is to say, in the protocol W, even Alice tells eavesdropper the information of R ik for each transmitted qubit, it is still as secure as the protocol EP 0 . Of course in the real game of protocol W, Alice does not tell any information about R ik to eavesdropper. So the security of protocol W is not lower than protocol EP 0 , which had been assumed to be maximally secure.
Proposition 3: If the quantum channel is symmetric, protocol 1 is maximally secure if set V is all possible states of the two level system. That is, the security is maximized if Alice chooses each state totally randomly on the Bloch sphere. In summary, we have given a general efficient protocol for QKD(protocol 1). In some special cases, it leads to the efficient BB84 protocol and efficient 6 state protocol. In all these protocols, Bob always takes his measurement in correct bases to each qubits. So in principle no qubit is wasted. The security is also proved. In particular, we give the maximum secure protocol for the symmetric channel. The results can obviously be extended to d−dimensional case [10] .
